$20 billion. That’s roughly the capital cost AEMO’s most recent Integrated System Plan attaches to the priority transmission projects needed to keep the lights on through the 2030s: VNI West, Marinus Link, the various REZ links in New South Wales and Queensland, the lot. It’s a number that gets quoted constantly in press releases and investor decks. What doesn’t get quoted nearly as often is the much simpler question sitting underneath it: who actually hands over that money, and when does it show up on a bill.
Everyone has a theory. Renewable developers say it’s an investment that pays for itself through cheaper wholesale prices. State governments say it’s nation-building, in the same breath as the Snowy Scheme. Critics on talkback radio say households are about to get slugged. None of these answers is quite honest, because transmission cost recovery in the NEM is a genuinely strange piece of regulatory plumbing, and almost nobody explains how it actually works before telling you who wins and loses.
So let’s do the plumbing first.
The regulated asset base mechanism
Transmission networks in Australia are natural monopolies. You can’t have three different companies running competing high-voltage lines down the same corridor – nobody’s proposing that, and nobody should. Because of that, the AER regulates what each transmission business (TransGrid in NSW, Powerlink in Queensland, AusNet and others in Victoria, ElectraNet in South Australia) is allowed to earn on its asset base. Build a new line, and its cost gets added to what’s called the Regulated Asset Base. The AER then sets a revenue allowance that lets the network recover its capital and operating costs over the asset’s life, plus a regulated rate of return, through charges paid by everyone who uses the network.
That revenue allowance flows into transmission use-of-system charges, which retailers pay and then pass through to customers as part of the network component of a power bill. It is not optional, it is not negotiated project by project, and it does not depend on whether a given line turns out to be a brilliant piece of infrastructure or a白 elephant. The AER’s job, under the National Electricity Rules, is to test whether the proposed spending is prudent and efficient – not to decide whether households should be the ones funding it. That decision was made decades ago, when the regulatory framework was built.
Which means the honest answer to who pays is: households and businesses pay, through the network tariff on every bill, spread over the 40-to-50-year asset life of the line. Not up front. Not visibly. Slowly, and for a long time.
Why generators don’t foot the bill
Here’s where the contrarian bit starts. A lot of renewable energy advocates will tell you transmission is effectively self-funding because new wind and solar projects need the capacity and should contribute toward it. In principle, connecting generators do pay connection costs: the spur line from the farm gate to the REZ backbone. But the backbone itself, the big interstate interconnectors and REZ trunk lines that make up most of that $20 billion, sits in the shared network and gets recovered from all customers through the RAB mechanism, not billed directly to the wind and solar projects that triggered the need for it.
I reckon that’s defensible as policy. You don’t want individual generators priced out of REZs by lumpy upfront transmission bills, and the whole point of REZ planning is to build shared infrastructure once rather than let every project duplicate its own line. But it does mean the public framing of “renewables are paying their own way” doesn’t survive contact with how the RAB actually works. The bill lands on retail customers. Follow the money and it ends up in the same place it always does: the network component of a quarterly statement, sitting next to wholesale, retail margin and environmental scheme costs.
That matters because transmission is now the fastest-growing line item on that bill, even as wholesale prices have occasionally gone negative in the middle of the day: a phenomenon I’ve written about before and one that confuses people who assume cheap generation automatically means cheap bills. It doesn’t, because the wires cost money regardless of what’s flowing through them.
The VNI West test case
Nowhere is this argument sharper than VNI West, the interconnector meant to link Victoria and NSW through a new corridor via Kerang. I’ve covered the project’s planning troubles in detail elsewhere – the short version is that landholder opposition, route changes and cost blowouts have pushed the project well past its original budget and timeline. Every dollar added to that budget eventually lands in AusNet’s and Transgrid’s regulated asset bases, which means every dollar flows through to transmission charges on both sides of the border, for decades, regardless of whether the final route turns out to be the optimal one.
This is the bit that should worry people who treat transmission cost overruns as an abstract engineering problem. They are not abstract. A route change driven by landholder negotiation in rural Victoria becomes a permanent addition to the RAB, and the RAB is what everyone’s bill is built on. There is no mechanism in the current framework that punishes a transmission business for an inefficient route the way a competitive market would punish a firm for a bad investment. The AER’s prudency test is meant to catch genuinely wasteful spending, but it’s applied after the fact, against a counterfactual nobody can fully verify, and transmission businesses have strong incentives – their allowed return is set as a percentage of the asset base – to build bigger rather than smaller.
The state government sweeteners
States have noticed the bill-shock risk, which is why several have stepped in with direct subsidies rather than leaving everything to the AER process. Queensland’s public ownership model for its pumped hydro and transmission ambitions, which I covered in the piece on the state’s energy plan, effectively substitutes government balance sheet risk for consumer tariff risk on some projects. NSW has done something similar with REZ scheme costs, folding part of the recovery into a separate scheme charge rather than letting it sit entirely inside TransGrid’s RAB.
These interventions are real, and they do shift some of the burden off household bills onto general taxation, which is a different group of payers with a different degree of progressivity. It’s worth being clear-eyed about what that actually changes: it doesn’t make the transmission cheaper, it just changes which pocket the money comes out of, and state budgets funding energy infrastructure are themselves funded by the same taxpayers who’d otherwise see it on their power bill. There’s no free money in this system. There’s only a choice about whether the charge is visible on an electricity bill or buried in a state budget line that gets debated once a year in a budget estimates hearing nobody outside Martin Place watches closely.
The counterfactual nobody likes
The case for building the transmission anyway rests on a counterfactual: what does it cost if you don’t. AEMO’s modelling, published through its Integrated System Plan process, consistently finds that the “do minimum” pathway, relying on existing transmission and building more gas peakers locally instead, costs more over the medium term than the REZ-and-interconnector approach, mostly because it leaves cheap renewable generation stranded behind congested lines and forces more expensive firming closer to load. That’s a genuine finding from a genuinely rigorous planning process, and I don’t think it’s wrong on the substance.
But “cheaper than the alternative” and “demonstrably good value for the household paying for it today” are two different claims, and the industry tends to collapse them into one. A line that’s cheaper than the counterfactual can still be an expensive asset riding on a bill that households didn’t choose and can’t easily opt out of. That’s not an argument against building transmission. It’s an argument for taking the AER’s prudency reviews far more seriously than the industry currently seems to, and for state governments to be upfront about the fact that a subsidy is a transfer, not a discount.
What this means for the next bill cycle
None of this is going to resolve cleanly, because the structural incentive is baked into the regulatory model: transmission businesses earn a return on what they build, the AER reviews but rarely blocks major projects outright, and state governments step in selectively rather than systematically. The AEMC continues to review aspects of the framework, including how REZ costs get allocated between connecting generators and the broader network, but nothing on the table changes the basic architecture where households carry the bulk of transmission risk through decades-long tariff exposure.
Worth watching is whether the next round of REZ projects in Central-West Orana – still, as I’ve noted in an earlier piece, half-wired years after announcement – comes in anywhere near budget. If it doesn’t, that’s another increment onto the RAB, another few dollars a quarter on bills that are already carrying the Marinus Link, VNI West and a growing list of REZ backbone projects. Australians are going to be funding this build-out one way or another, whether through tariffs or taxes. The only real choice left is whether anyone in Canberra or the state capitals is willing to say so plainly, instead of letting “the transition pays for itself” do the talking.
– Marcus Wren, Editor
Photo by Lukas Bato on Unsplash