Drive the Golden Highway between Dunedoo and Merotherie on a clear day and you’ll see the paddocks that are meant to carry a fair slice of NSW’s coal replacement. Turbines at Liverpool Range, solar arrays staged near Narromine and Dubbo, and underneath all of it, still being dug in, the transmission that’s supposed to connect them to the rest of the grid. The Central-West Orana Renewable Energy Zone was declared first among NSW’s five REZs for a reason. It had the wind and solar resource and the existing Wellington-to-Wollar corridor to build on. Three years after the NSW government locked it in, that first-mover advantage has turned into something closer to a cautionary tale about how hard it is to build 500 kilometres of new transmission on a schedule set by generator contracts.
Let’s be careful with what “first REZ” actually means here, because the term gets used loosely. The Central-West Orana REZ isn’t one project. It’s a declared zone under the NSW Electricity Infrastructure Roadmap, covering roughly 20 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity seeking connection, against a network that’s being built to carry a fraction of that. AEMO’s own Integrated System Plan treats REZs as the backbone of the transition – new transmission corridors timed to match coal retirements. Central-West Orana was supposed to prove that model could work on schedule. Instead it’s become the case study for what happens when the transmission build and the generation build move at different speeds.
What ACEREZ is actually building #
The transmission piece sits with ACEREZ, a joint venture between ACEN (the Philippines-based developer that also holds wind and solar assets in the zone) and Acciona, selected as the private network operator to design, build, own and operate the backbone. This is the model NSW chose instead of having a government-owned transmission business do it directly, and it’s worth sitting with that choice for a second: ACEREZ isn’t just hanging wires, it’s underwriting the risk of the biggest privately financed REZ transmission project the state has attempted.
The scope is large by any Australian standard: new and augmented 500kV and 330kV lines threading through Merotherie, Elong Elong and down toward the existing network near Wollar, designed to lift the zone’s export capacity substantially above what the legacy lines could ever carry. NSW’s Energy Infrastructure Roadmap always framed Central-West Orana as the proof point for the other four zones: New England, South West, Hunter-Central Coast and the Illawarra. If the contracting, easement and construction model works here, it gets reused. If it doesn’t, every other REZ timeline slips too.
Where the build actually sits #
As of late 2026, sections of the network are energised and carrying generator output, but the full backbone isn’t complete, and ACEREZ has publicly flagged delays relative to the original contracted dates. Easement negotiation with landholders along the corridor has taken longer than scheduled in places, and construction has run into the same labour and equipment constraints affecting transmission builds right across the eastern states – VNI West and Marinus Link are fighting over the same skilled crews and the same transformer supply chains. I’ve covered VNI West’s own route disputes and the pattern rhymes: a corridor gets approved on paper years before the steel goes in the ground, and the gap between those two dates is where most of the public frustration lands.
Generators that signed connection agreements years ago, expecting to be exporting by now, are instead running at partial output or waiting entirely. That’s not a criticism unique to ACEN or ACEREZ. It’s the structural problem with the REZ model generally, which I’ve written about before in the context of NSW’s coal exit outrunning its REZ rollout. The zones get declared, the generation investment follows the declaration, and the wires catch up on a different clock entirely.
The megawatt and megawatt-hour of it #
It’s worth doing the worked example here because the headline capacity figures for Central-West Orana get thrown around loosely in public debate. Twenty gigawatts of proposed capacity sounds enormous, and it is, but that’s the nameplate figure across every project that has lodged a connection application, not what’s actually built, contracted or even likely to proceed. A wind farm rated at, say, 400MW will generate at that peak only in strong, sustained wind; its actual annual energy output, measured in megawatt-hours, depends on its capacity factor, typically somewhere in the 35-40% range for good NSW wind sites. Multiply 400MW by 8,760 hours in a year and you get a theoretical ceiling near 3,500,000MWh; apply a 38% capacity factor and the realistic annual output lands closer to 1,330,000MWh. That gap between nameplate and delivered energy is exactly why AEMO’s planning documents, including the latest Integrated System Plan, work in both units side by side rather than quoting a single capacity figure and calling it done.
The same caution applies to the REZ’s claimed export capacity once ACEREZ’s network is complete. A transmission corridor rated to carry several gigawatts of power doesn’t mean several gigawatts flow continuously. It means that’s the ceiling in the hours when wind and solar across the zone are all producing near their peaks simultaneously, which doesn’t happen often and never for long. The real test of whether the investment pays off is how much energy gets exported across a full year, not the peak figure used in the press release.
Who’s actually building generation in the zone #
ACEN itself holds a chunk of the generation pipeline here, alongside its transmission role through ACEREZ: an arrangement that raises the obvious governance question of a company that both builds generation seeking connection and co-owns the network deciding who connects and when. ACEN has addressed this in public statements by pointing to ring-fencing arrangements and the oversight role the AER and AEMO retain over network access rules; whether that satisfies other generators competing for the same limited early capacity is a live argument in the zone, not a settled one. Other developers with projects staged in or near the zone include wind proponents at Liverpool Range and Spicers Creek, and solar proponents around Narromine, each contracted on connection dates that assumed the backbone would be ready well before now.
This is the part of the REZ model I think doesn’t get enough scrutiny in the glossy roadmap documents: when a private consortium owns both the network and generation assets in the same declared zone, the incentive to prioritise its own projects during a capacity-constrained ramp-up is structural, not a matter of intent. I’m not alleging anything improper has occurred. I haven’t seen evidence of it, and ACEN has been upfront about network access being governed by AEMO’s standard connection rules. But it’s a model worth watching closely as the other four NSW REZs get built out, because the same conflict sits latent in each of them if the operator also develops generation.
Why Eraring’s timeline makes this matter more #
None of this would carry quite the same weight if Eraring weren’t still the biggest single generator feeding NSW demand. The extension deal struck between Origin and the NSW government, which I covered in detail when it landed, bought the state roughly two more winters of coal capacity while the replacement generation gets built – see Eraring at 2027: the deal that bought NSW two more winters. That extension was explicitly framed around giving REZ transmission and storage time to catch up. Central-West Orana is one of the two biggest pieces of that catch-up plan, alongside the Waratah Super Battery sitting at the other end of the state absorbing system shocks – I’ve written about Waratah’s role as the grid’s shock absorber and the two projects are more connected than the public conversation usually credits them for. If Central-West Orana’s backbone slips further, the Eraring extension stops looking like a two-winter buffer and starts looking like the first instalment of a longer one.
The contrarian bit #
Here’s where I’ll put my own view on the table rather than just reporting both sides: I think NSW made a reasonable bet choosing a privately financed, privately operated transmission model for its first REZ, but I don’t think the contracting framework priced in the realistic timeline for a 500-kilometre corridor crossing freehold land with no prior history of transmission easements at this scale. AEMO’s connections process and the NSW roadmap both assumed easement negotiation and construction could run roughly in parallel with generator financial close. In practice they haven’t, and ACEREZ inherited a schedule that was optimistic before a single survey peg went in the ground. That’s not a scandal. It’s a planning assumption that didn’t survive contact with rural land tenure, and the other four REZs should be funded and contracted on the assumption that it will happen again, not on the hope that Central-West Orana was an outlier.
What to watch through 2027 #
The figure that will actually tell you whether this zone is working is the exported energy figure AEMO publishes in its quarterly reports once the backbone is substantially complete, not the nameplate capacity figure, not the number of connection agreements signed. Keep an eye on the NSW government’s own progress updates under the Energy Infrastructure Roadmap, and on AEMO’s connections register for the zone, which tracks how many projects have moved from “committed” to “connected” rather than sitting in the queue. I’ll be back on this one when the next tranche of the backbone energises – probably worth a longer look at how the other four REZs are tracking against the lessons this one is still teaching.
On a quieter note – I took a long ride out past Mudgee a few months back, roughly along the corridor this line follows, and it’s genuinely strange country to be laying 500kV steel through: flat cropping land giving way to hard ridgelines with almost no existing infrastructure to anchor against. You come away from that drive with more sympathy for why the schedule slipped than the press releases tend to allow for.
– Anjali Rao, Grid & Storage Correspondent
Photo by Thomas Despeyroux on Unsplash